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NOTES AND COMMENTS
COMMENT: Libel and
the Public Official
A study of the law of criminal libel' is
significant because no other segment of the
law reflects, with such unique precision,
the evolution of the right to freedom of
speech in a democratic society. In order to
understand the law as it developed, its his-
torical background must be examined. In
addition, an analysis of the most recent
Supreme Court decision in this area, Gar-
rison v. Louisiana,2 is essential in order to
understand precisely what the law of crim-
inal libel is today.
History
In England the first courts to assume
jurisdiction over libels were the ecclesias-
tical tribunals., Soon, however, secular
courts pre-empted the field because of the
inadequacy of the punishment imposed by
the Church. 4 As society became increas-
ingly complex, statutes were passed giving
1 The term "criminal libel" embodies both se-
ditious libel (libel directed against the govern-
ment and/or governmental officials) and per-
sonal libels which directly cause breaches of the
peace. This article will consider only the seditious
area of the law, as criminal prosecutions of
personal libels are practically nonexistent due to
the popularity of the tort action. Kelly, Criminal
Libel and Free Speech, 6 KAN. L. REV. 295
(1958).
2 _U. S.- (1964).
3 The Church assumed the power to punish libels
based upon its jurisdiction over sexual offenses.
See Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949
Wis. L. REV. 101, 103-04.
4The usual ecclesiastical punishment constituted
a public acknowledgment of the baselessness of
the imputation. Ibid.
royal judges the authority to punish false
statements made against the "great men of
the realm." 5 The rationale offered for these
enactments was the need to preserve the
people's loyalty to their rulers, and hence
to stabilize the government. These statutes
were significant in that for the first time
the primacy of a ruling group could be
maintained by controlling the communi-
cation of ideas.6
In 1606 the Star Chamber decided the
case of De Libellis Famosis,7 which has
become the foundation of all subsequent
cases involving criminal libel. It was held
that all statements which tended to create
breaches of the peace, especially those di-
rected at the government or its ministers,
were criminally libelous. Since the Star
Chamber was not concerned with the truth
or falsity of the statement, the government
was endowed with a potent weapon for
crushing political criticism.8 An accurate
maxim of the time was "the greater the
truth, the greater the libel." 9
In 1641, the common-law courts re-
placed the Star Chamber. These courts
added an oppressive procedure. The judge,
rather than the jury, would make the de-
termination of whether the statement was
libelous. The jury was permitted to deter-
mine only the fact of publication.1 0 "Thus
a royally appointed judge became the ex
post facto arbiter of the extent of freedom
5 3 Edw. 1, c. 34 (1275).
6 Kelly, supra note 1, at 298.
777 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606).
8 Kelly, supra note 1, at 301.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
of speech."'"
Reform of the law of criminal libel was
initiated by English liberals in the latter
half of the nineteenth century. The efforts
of this group culminated in the passage of
Fox's Libel Act,1 2 which revested the jury
with the right to determine the intent of the
publisher as well as the fact of publication.
Further liberalization occurred in 1843,
with the passage of Lord Campbell's Act.13
This act provided that a true statement
published for the public benefit was not
criminally punishable. This is still the law
in England today and was the majority
view in the United States until the decision
in Garrison v. Louisiana.14
Early American decisions adopted the
English common-law concept of criminal
libel with respect to statements concerning
public officials or governmental conduct.'
A literal reading of the first amendment,
which prohibits laws abridging freedom of
speech and press, would appear to abol-
ish the common-law concept of criminal
libel. However, judicial opinion indicated
that the first amendment merely prohibited
"prior restraint" and did not alter the com-
mon-law doctrine of criminal libel.' 6
The short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts
of 1798,1" however, did change, at least
to some extent, the common-law concept
11 Ibid.
12 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792).
13 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, § 6 (1843). See Comment,
Libel: The Illinois Truth Defense, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 547, 549 (1961).
14 -U.S. 
- (1964).
15 Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's St. Tr.
672 (N.Y. 1735); Kelly, supra note 1, at 306-07.
16 E.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304
(Mass. 1825); Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas 319
(Pa. 1788). For a discussion of this early period,
see WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
236-39 (1911).
'7 Ch. 63, 1 Stat. 570, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
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of criminal libel in the United States. These
acts made it a crime to speak or write any
statement which tended to defame the Con-
gress or the President. Contrary to the
common-law doctrine, truth could now be
pleaded as a defense.
After the repeal of the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, the case of People v. Croswell"s
laid the foundation for a new approach to
the law of criminal libel. The lower court,
applying the common-law doctrine, had
convicted the defendant-newspaper editor
of libeling President Jefferson. Upon mo-
tion for a new trial the defendant argued
that freedom of speech embodies the "right
to publish, with impunity, truth, with good
motives for justifiable ends, though reflect-
ing on government, magistracy, or indi-
viduals."19 The motion was denied. How-
ever, the New York Legislature, recogniz-
ing the soundness of the defendant's argu-
ment, enacted a statute which made truth,
published with good motives and for justi-
fiable ends, a complete defense. 20 The stat-
ute applied to statements concerning pub-
lic officials, as well as to those directed
against private individuals. Two years later
a Massachusetts court, following New York
precedent, held that truth published with
the "honest intention of informing the
people" was not actionable libel. 21 As a
result of these cases the majority of states
enacted statutes adopting the "truth with
good motives" formula.
22
This formula, although liberalizing the
common-law rule, did not completely en-
gender today's concept of the first amend-
ment protection. The "good motives" limi-
Is 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
'9 Id. at 352.
20 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1805, ch. 90, § 2.
21 Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 (1808).
2 Comment, supra note 13.
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tation did not offer protection to truthful
statements made with "actual malice.
23
As a practical matter, when a popular poli-
tical figure was the object of a defendant's
remarks, it was almost impossible for the
defendant to establish lack of malice. 24
Libel Today
Although the "truth with good motives"
formula was the majority view, a number
of states gave greater latitude to the de-
fense of truth when the defamation con-
cerned public officials.2 5 In State v. Burn-
ham, 20 a New Hampshire court held that it
would not apply the "good motives" for-
mula to statements made by the defendant
about the conduct of certain public offi-
cials. The court stated that
it has been said that it is lawful to publish
truth from good motives, and for justifi-
able ends. But this rule is too narrow. If
there is a lawful occasion-a legal right
to make a publication-and the matter
true, the end is justifiable and that, in
such case, must be sufficient.27
Thus, there was some conflict in the law
which was not resolved until 1964 when
the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Garrison v. Louisiana.
28
In Garrison, the appellant had been con-
victed of criminal libel, under the Louisi-
ana criminal defamation statute,2 for dis-
paraging the official conduct of eight crim-
2 In the area of civil libel, however, truth had
been held to be a complete defense. PROSSER,
TORTS § 111 (3d ed. 1964).
24 Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Can-
didates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 893 n. 90 (1949).
25 See Garrison v. Louisiana, - U.S.
- (1964).
269 N.H. 34, 31 Am. Dec. 217 (1837).
27 Id. at 221.
2 Garrison v. Louisiana, - U.S. - (1964).
29 LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 47 (1950).
inal court judges. Under the statute, an in-
dividual could be prosecuted if he uttered
true statements with actual malice. ° The
Supreme Court reversed the state court
conviction and held that the statute em-
ployed unconstitutional standards when ap-
plied to criticism of public officials.-
In stating that the "truth with good mo-
tives" formula was unconstitutional, the
Court indicated that a person who made a
truthful statement concerning a public offi-
cial had complete immunity from criminal
prosecution. The Court, however, did not
limit its opinion to this issue, but held fur-
ther that immunity would attach even were
the statement false, provided that it had
not been made with "actual malice." In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court relied on its decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan,2' 2 decided earlier in the
same year.
(a) The Times Case
In Times, a civil suit was brought by a
public official to recover damages for de-
famatory criticism of his official conduct.
Even though the jury had been instructed
that truth was a complete defense, the Su-
preme Court declared that this was an in-
adequate protection under the require-
ments of the first amendment. It held that
a state could constitutionally award dam-
ages in libel actions to public officials
against critics of their official conduct only
20 Ibid.
31 Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 28, at
Technically it is still possible to have a criminal
prosecution for true statements, made with malice,
by an individual, when directed against another
"individual." See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
22 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
when the statement was false and made
"with knowledge that it was false or with a
reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not."
33
The Times decision thus substantially
changed the law of civil libel in regard to
statements concerning public officials.
Thereafter, all truthful statements and all
false statements made in good faith were
constitutionally protected. In granting a
privilege to honestly made erroneous state-
ments, the Court recognized that several
state courts had adopted a similar rule.34
For example, in Coleman v. MacLennon35 a
newspaper publisher was sued for libeling
a candidate for public office in relation to
his official conduct. The trial court in-
structed the jury that even if the words
were false, the plaintiff could not recover
unless he proved actual malice. On ap-
peal, the trial court's instruction was sus-
tained: "The public benefit from publicity
is so great, and the chance of injury to pri-
vate character so small that such discus-
sion must be privileged.' ' 36
In explaining the necessity for the adop-
tion of this rule by the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
pointed out that "compelling the critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of
all his factual assertions . . . leads to a
comparable 'self-censorship' "37 and would
oblige the individual to make statements
which " 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone.' 3 The Court concluded that, since
such a restriction would dampen the vigor
33 Id. at 279-80.
3' ld. at 280.
35 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
36 Id. at 724, 98 Pac. at 286.
3 New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 32, at
279.
38 Ibid.
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and limit the variety of public debate, it
was "inconsistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. '""
The Times decision is consistent with
the rationale of the cases which have
granted immunity to statements made by
public officials concerning other public offi-
cials or governmental conduct. 4 This latter
immunity was granted because the Supreme
Court recognized that greater benefit to
society could be derived by permitting a
public official to bring to light encroach-
ments upon the democratic freedoms, not-
withstanding the possibility of injury to the
reputation of individuals occasioned by
false statements. Since an individual has as
great an interest in the proper function of
our government as the public official, he
too should be afforded an analogous privi-
lege.
41
(b) The Garrison Case
Since the Times case involved the con-
stitutional limitation on civil libel actions
brought by public officials, the appellee in
Garrison argued that the rationale for that
holding could not be applied to the law of
criminal libel since the history and purpose
of these areas differed markedly. 42 The
Court rejected this argument. Whether the
libel is criminal or civil, it must satisfy
constitutional standards. Hence, the case
law in the area of civil libel could be in-
terposed in cases dealing with criminal
39 Ibid.
40 The immunity granted an official in the scope
of his office, however, is not limited merely to
statements made concerning other public officials
or governmental activity, but is general in nature.
Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
41 New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 32,
at 282.
42 Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 28, at
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libels.43
Several conclusions can definitely be de-
duced from the Garrison decision. A crim-
inal libel statute in order to be consistent
with the constitution cannot impose a crim-
inal penalty for (1) a truthful statement,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the
maker; or (2) a false statement made in
good faith. However, if the false state-
ment is made with actual malice or with
reckless disregard of its falsity, no im-
munity will attach. In that event, the bur-
den of proving either actual malice or the
wanton disregard as to its falsity would be
upon the prosecution.4" Thus, the Garri-
son and Times decisions have their great-
est impact in the widening of the protect-
ible area to include the innocent false
statement.
Conclusion
The language in the Times and Garrison
opinions indicates that the rationale for
the expansion of free speech was to insure
43 Id. at -
44 Although the Times case involved only a news-
paper defendant, it appears that the rule an-
nounced by the Court would apply with equal
vigor to a case involving an "individual" defend-
ant. This conclusion is supported by the generic
nature of the language in Times coupled with the
Court's application of the Times' rule to an "in-
dividual" defendant in Garrison.
the uninhibited debate on matters of public
concern. It is, therefore, submitted that the
rationale of these decisions should be ap-
plied to any case involving an issue in
which the public has a substantial interest.
It would be fatuous to assert that "public
concern" is limited solely to an interest in
the proper functioning of government, es-
pecially when there are many areas, apart
from the administration of government, in
which the public has a vital interest. Con-
sider the magnitude of the controversy and
public concern engendered by the issues of
race relations, union management, labor
strikes, and closing laws. The emotional
nature of debate on those matters is cer-
tainly no less intense than debate in the
area of government operation, and the
issues involved are certainly no less im-
portant. It appears equally compelling,
therefore, that the safeguards espoused in
Times and Garrison be applied to these
areas to insure debate and permit the free
dissemination of ideas regarding vital
issues. This result seems within the realm
of future realization since the Court is al-
ready profoundly committed "to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open....
45 New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 32,
at 270.
